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The Contingency Factor in
Attorney Fee Awards
John Leubsdorft
When a lawyer bringing a suit is to be paid only if his client pre-
vails, he may avoid cases unlikely to succeed. It might therefore seem
desirable that courts awarding attorney fees to victorious plaintiffs add
a contingency bonus to the basic fee award in cases that the plaintiff
was unlikely to win, to give lawyers for nonpaying clients an incen-
tive to take risky as well as sure cases. The grant of such a bonus has
become increasingly common" as the award of attorney fees to suc-
cessful plaintiffs has become more frequent2 and as the standards for
assessing those fees have received more attention.3
- Professor, Boston University School of Law. I appreciate the help and support of
Tamar Frankel, Laurence Fordham, Aviam Soifer, Richard Speidel, Kathleen A. Sullivan,
and others.
1. Seven of the federal courts of appeals have approved the award of contingency
bonuses. See International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255,
1273-74 (8th Cir. 1980); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 638 (6th Cir. 1979);
Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 1979); Wolf v. Frank, 555 F.2d 1213,
1218 (5th Cir. 1977) (limited to facts); Pete v. UMW Welfare 8- Retirement Fund of
1950, 517 F.2d 1275, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1975); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d
448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973). Some state courts have also done so.
See Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 48-49, 569 P.2d 1303, 1316, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 328
(1977); Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Village Mall Townhouses, Inc., 90 Misc.
2d 227, 231-32, 394 N.Y.S.2d 772, 776 (Sup. Ct. 1977); cf. Thomas v. Bailey, 611 P.2d 536,
542-43 (Alaska 1980) (conceding appropriateness of contingency bonus in some cases, but
refusing to enhance fee award in instant case).
2. During the Supreme Court's October 1979 term, no less than seven cases dealt with
liability to pay attorney fees. Maher v. Gagne, 100 S. Ct. 2570 (1980); Maine v. Thiboutot,
100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 100 S. Ct. 2455 (1980); New York
Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754
(1980); Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Boeing Co. v. Van
Gemert, 100 S. Ct. 745 (1980). These cases, however, did not deal with standards for
calculating attorney fee awards.
3. See, e.g., Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What Is "Reasonable"? 126 U.
PA. L. REv. 281 (1977); Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Liti-
gation, 88 HARv. L. REv. 849 (1975).
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Despite this growing acceptance, profound difficulties attend the
notion that, the less likely a case was to be won, the larger the fee
that the court should award the lawyer who wins it. If the weakest
case gets the largest fee, lawyer-client interests will diverge: the tri-
umphant lawyer will be tempted to build up the fee by stressing the
weakness of his client's case. In addition, a court will have trouble
assessing how likely a claim was to succeed when it has already found
the claim meritorious. And it seems perverse to exact larger payments
when there was a solid defense and the plaintiff had a weak case, and
smaller payments when the plaintiff's case was strong and the defen-
dant's resistance less justified.
The gravest flaw of the current contingency bonus, however, is its
grounding in an inadequate theory of how large an incentive courts
should provide for risky litigation. The contingency bonus affects the
level of private litigation and can be of crucial importance in decid-
ing how many rights are privately enforced. The current theory of
contingency bonuses implies that lawyers and clients should be made
as willing to bring a feeble suit as a promising one. This theory is as
defective as its results would be undesirable, yet present doctrine does
not point the way to a more realistic and appropriate level of incentives.
These difficulties can be avoided, this article argues, without aban-
doning the correct perception that reasonable fees must be larger
when the plaintiff's lawyer will be paid only if his client succeeds
than when he will be paid regardless of success. The key point is
that the contingency bonus should not be tied to a particular claim's
probability of success when it was first asserted. Rather, the con-
tingency bonus should be prescribed for categories of cases and
should reflect a judgment about how much encouragement each cate-
gory should receive. This prescription may require legislative deci-
sions; indeed, the nearest approach to it so far is found in the Jus-
tice Department's proposals for reforming the class action by statute.4
Absent legislation, however, a court could and should implement one
of several alternative approaches. It could set a contingency bonus
that would bring the success rate in fee award cases into line with
that found in the market where plaintiffs pay for their own litiga-
tion. It might also simply multiply all fee awards by two, on the
theory that the promise of doubled fees would encourage the bring-
4. S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1978); see pp. 505-06 inlra (discussing bill).
This provision has been omitted from a later version of the proposed legislation. See
H.R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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ing of suits with at least an even chance of success. Before reaching
these proposals, however, we must first have a clearer picture of the
contingency factor, its emergence in fee awards, and the resulting
problems.
I. The Legitimation of the Contingency Factor
The rise of the contingency factor reflects changing attitudes to-
ward the business of lawyering. The nineteenth century cases found
it hard to break loose from a view of lawyers as supplying routine
services for routine fees. More recent decisions treat the lawyer as
an entrepreneur, who will invest his time in litigating a case only
if the expected return-the fee obtainable multiplied by the prob-
ability of obtaining it-is as large as what could be expected from
competing investments.
The notion that a lawyer who risked not being paid if he lost
the case should be paid more if he won made its first judicial ap-
pearance in the nineteenth century, only to be flatly rejected.5 The
issue arose in suits by lawyers against their own clients," and the
contingency involved was the inability of a poor plaintiff to pay a
fee if he lost the suit. Courts rejected the claim that a poor plaintiff
should pay more than a rich plaintiff, replying that the value of a
lawyer's services is not determined by the client's wealth.7  How-
ever, as the century ended and as contingent fee contracts became
more acceptable,8 courts9 and the American Bar Association'
0 up-
held reliance on the contingency factor in assessing what a client
owed his lawyer. The factor was still rejected when fees were col-
lected from parties who had not consented to representation, wheth-
5. Robbins v. Harvey, 5 Conn. 335, 341-42 (1824); Gilbert v. Fay, 4 App. D.C. 38, 40
(1894); O'Neill v. Crane, 65 A.D. 358, 360, 72 N.Y.S. 812, 813-14 (1901); Christy & Liggett
v. Douglas, [1833-36] Ohio (Wright) 485, 486 (1834).
6. The "American Rule" prevented the assertion of a fee claim against a defeated
opponent. See The Baltimore, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 377, 388-92 (1869); Nussbaum, Attorney's
Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 301, 311-13 (1973).
7. See, e.g., Robbins v. Harvey, 5 Conn. 335, 342 (1824) (criticizing "the attempt to
tax [the plaintiff's] poverty, by a recurrence to the doctrine of chances").
8. See F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 39, 42-44 (1964); E. WEEKS,
A TRETISE ON ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW 717 (2d ed. 1892).
9. See, e.g., Leitensdorfer v. King, 7 Colo. 436, 442, 4 P. 37, 41 (1884); Succession of
Linton, 31 La. Ann. 130, 132 (1879); Smith v. Couch, 117 Mo. App. 267, 272, 92 S.W.
1143, 1145 (1906).
10. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Nos. 12(5), 13 (1908) (current versions at
ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RULE 2-106(B)(8), ETHI-
CAL CONSIDERATION 2-20 (1980)).
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er these were losing defendants subject to statutory attorney fees"
or involuntary beneficiaries of litigation.' 2
The "common fund" theory of fee awards eventually extended
reliance on the contingency factor to cases involving the latter class,
involuntary beneficiaries. Under the theory, when a plaintiff created
a fund benefiting a group of persons, the costs of the creation were
to be paid out of the fund to the plaintiff-or to his lawyer. Other-
wise, the beneficiaries would have been unjustly enriched by the
plaintiff's efforts.' 3 The theory purported to rest on traditional un-
just enrichment principles, but as Professor Dawson has shown, it
stretched these principles to an extent justifiable only by an un-
articulated judgment that special incentives should be given for liti-
gation benefiting certain groups.'
4
The concept of a contingency factor entered fee award doctrine
in the 1930s as part of this new stress on incentives. Judge Woolsey'0
and Professor Hornstein'G argued that if fee award litigation was to
be brought, lawyers must be paid on a scale reflecting their risk in
accepting cases that might not succeed. Thereafter, the contingency
factor became a routine ground for increasing fees.
17
In making awards, courts did not consider how much of an in-
centive was needed for different sorts of cases or, with a few ex-
ceptions,' 8 whether the risk of failure in the case in question had
been large or small. The fee was calculated-to the extent any cal-
culation was disclosed-as a percentage of the total recovery.1 9 Other
11. See Business Men's Assurance Co. v. Campbell, 18 F.2d 223, 226 (8th Cir. 1927);
Merchants' Fire Ins. Co. v. McAdams, 88 Ark. 550, 557, 115 S.V. 175, 179 (1908); Southand
Life Ins. Co. v. Norton, 5 S.W.2d 767, 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
12. See Graham v. Dubuque Specialty Mach. Works, 138 Iowa 456, 463, 114 N.W.
619, 622 (1908); Louisville Bridge Co. v. Dodd, 85 S.V. 683, 684 (Ky. 1905).
13. See, e.g., Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 531-37 (1881).
14. Dawson, supra note 3, at 875; Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney
Fees From Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1602-07 (1974); see Dawson, The Self.Serving
Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1974). The discussion in this section is much in-
debted to Professor Dawson's scholarship.
15. In re Qsofsky, 50 F.2d 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
16. Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 39 COLUNI. L. REV.
784, 812-13 (1939). See also Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in
Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REV. 658 (1956).
17. See, e.g., Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 189 (1st Cir. 1959); In re Detroit Int'l
Bridge Co., 111 F.2d 235, 237 (6th Cir. 1940); In re Supreme Appliance & Heating Co.,
92 F. Supp. 487, 488 (W.D. Ky. 1950).
18. See Stokes v. Sedberry, 275 F.2d 894, 901 (6th Cir. 1921), rev'd on other grounds,
261 U.S. 571 (1923); Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 609,
672, 682 (1951). Some other courts noted that there was little risk in the particular case,
and hence no occasion to increase the fee. See United States v. Equitable Trust Co., 283
U.S. 738, 746 (1931); Murphy v. North Am. Light & Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 567, 570
(S.D.N.Y. 1940).
19. E.g., Pergament v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 224 F.2d 80, 84 (6th Cir. 1955); Rosenfeld
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factors might also influence the fee, though their weight was not
disclosed.2 0 The result was to put the plaintiff's lawyer roughly on
a par with other contingent fee litigators. The big difference, of
course, was that the members of the benefited group had never
agreed to hire the lawyer. Here, the unjust enrichment rationale
came into play to justify a percentage fee. Since an attorney fee
was awarded because of the benefits received by the group, its size
should be proportional to those benefits.2 ' A contingency factor was
thus linked to the percentage contingent fee. Since much of the plain-
tiffs' bar was accustomed to that kind of fee2 2 this approach also
provided sufficient-and sometimes excessive2 3-incentives for the bar.
Three developments, however, necessitated changes in the method
of awarding attorney fees, changes that resulted in the emergence of
contingency awards as an explicit device for encouraging litigation.
First, Congress increased the number of fee statutes,' 4 which typi-
cally awarded attorney fees against defeated parties, not against bene-
fiting ones. They were based, not on unjust enrichment principles,
but on the desirability of helping to enforce the law by providing
an incentive for lawyers. 25 Second, the number and size of fee awards20
grew with the increase in fee statutes and in class actions falling
v. Black, 56 F.R.D. 604, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Neuberger v. Barrett, 180 Misc. 222, 224,
39 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
20. See, e.g., In re Osofsky, 50 F.2d 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (other factors included
time fairly and properly used, quality of skill demanded by situation, skill actually em-
ployed in meeting situation, amount involved, and eminence of lawyer).
21. See Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholders' Derivative Suits, supra note 16,
at 811-12.
22. See F. MAcKINNON, supra note 8, at 115 (estimating that 14% of New York bar's
gross income came from contingent fees). Since only a fraction of legal services is ren-
dered by lawyers representing plaintiffs in civil litigation, and since only such lawyers
receive contingent fees, it seems to follow from this gross income statistic that a very
large share of civil litigation is handled on a contingent fee basis.
23. See, e.g., Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Snpp. 1311, 1315-16 (D.D.C. 1973), modified sub
noin. Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (denying percentage contingent fee
award because typically large size of class action judgments would make such awards
excessive); ef. Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D. 26, 30 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (dictum) (suggesting that principal function of liberal class action rules is to yield
"golden harvest of fees" for lawyers).
24. See 3 H. NEWBERG, CtAss AcTiONS § 7040 (1977 & 1980 Supp.) (collecting statutes).
The statutes have been generously construed. See, e.g., New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v.
Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980) (expanding Civil Rights Act provision that authorizes fee
awards in "action or proceeding thereunder" to authorize award in state administrative
proceeding); Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974) (construing fee statute to authorize
award for work done prior to enactment); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390
U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam) (fee award ordinarily appropriate in successful Title II suit,
not merely when friolous defenses are asserted).
25. See Berger, supra note 3, at 306-10 (citing authorities).
26. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 79 (2d Cir. 1971),
rcv'd on other grounds sub norn. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409
U.S. 363 (1973) (approving fee award of $7.5 million in extraordinary case).
477
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 90: 473, 1981
under the common-fund doctrine. As fee awards became more im-
portant, standards that left trial judges free to award without ex-
planation almost any percentage or sum were no longer tenable.
Third, statutory27 and other 28 fees were awarded in cases in which
plaintiffs recovered no monetary award. No longer could courts
simply award lawyers a percentage of funds already within the courts'
control. The courts had to order defendants to pay and had to de-
cide how large a payment public policy required.
During the last decade, courts have begun to compute attorney
fees based on per hour rates, as modified by the contingency and
other factors. The two leading cases espousing this approach are the
Third Circuit's decision in Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.2 9 and the Second Circuit's in City
of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.30 Their approach has spread from class
action settlements to a variety of other actions,31 as well as to other
courts.
32
Under Lindy and Grinnell, the contingency factor took the form
that still prevails and that will be the target of this article's criti-
27. See, e.g., Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973) (per curiam) (statute
authorizing fee for school desegregation cases).
28. By an extension of the common-fund theory, see Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank,
307 U.S. 161, 166-67 (1939) (court of equity has discretion to award attorney fees when
plaintiff's suit benefits third parties), defendant unions and corporations were required
to pay for their own reform. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1973) (union); Mills '.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970) (corporation). But cf. Al)eska Pipeline
Serv. Co. Y. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 262-71 (1975) (suit conferring public benefit
does not entitle plaintiff to fee award against defendant). Attorney fees were also awarded
against parties litigating in bad faith. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 100 S. Ct.
2455, 2461-62 (1980); Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 949-51 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 933 (1972).
29. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
30. 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974); accord, Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1973),
modified sub nor. Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
31. See, e.g., Baughman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 583 F.2d 1208, 1214-20
(3d Cir. 1978) (Clayton Act); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs, United States Dep't of Labor, 542 F.2d 602, 609-11 (3d Cir. 1976)
(Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); Torres v. Sachs, 69 F.R.D.
343, 346-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976) (supplemental memorandum)
(Voting Rights Act). But cf. Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020 (3d Cir.
1977) (importance of contingency factor may be reduced when statute rather than com-
mon-benefit doctrine is source of fee award).
32. See, e.g., Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d 915, 919-20 (1st Cir. 1980); Copeland v.
Marshall, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967, 974 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 1980) (en banc); Northcross
v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 636-43 (6th Cir. 1979) (by implication); Grunin v. Inter-
national House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 127 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975);
Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Village Mall Townhouses, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 227,




cism. Courts were to multiply the basic hourly fee award if the
chances that the case in question would succeed were small.3 3 The
dimmer the plaintiff's original prospect, the larger the bonus his
lawyer was to receive if successful. The contingency in each case
was to be evaluated in light of all the obstacles the plaintiff faced
when the case began, and "might well be translated into mathe-
matical terms."3
4
The resulting increase in the hourly fee can be far from trivial.
Fees have been tripled, 35 although sometimes the contingency fac-
tor has not been the sole ground for the increase. 36 No doubt the
attempt of courts to make fee awards more modest and more uni-
form37 has led lawyers and judges who seek to sustain large awards
to look to the most flexible part of the new system, the multi-
plication of the basic hourly fee by a figure set by the court. In-
deed, the contingency bonus has been welcomed even by some courts
that do not use the Lindy-Grinnell hourly fee approach. 38
33. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540
F.2d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 1976); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 448 (2d Cir.
1974).
34. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974).
35. See Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (fee tripled because of
contingency).
36. See Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403, 414 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (fee multiplied by 3.5
because of contingency, high quality of counsel's work, and inflation); Fried v. Utilities
Leasing Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,695 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (quadrupling would be warranted by contingency and high quality of counsel's
work); In re Gypsum Cases, 386 F. Supp. 959, 967 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (tripling for contin-
gency, ability, and success). The Justice Department's proposed bill to reform class ac-
tions, S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1978), would authorize a risk multiplier of up
to three. A recent survey reports an average multiplier of 1.5, but includes several mul-
tipliers between 2.5 and 4.03. Attorney Fee Awards in Antitrust and Securities Class
Actions, CLASs ACT. REP. 82, 84-121 (1980).
37. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 469-71 (2d Cir. 1974) (setting
forth fee award standards to give "meaningful guidance" to lower courts and to avoid
problem of windfall attorney fees); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 166-68 (3d Cir. 1973) (establishing standards to
provide "meaningful guidance").
38. The Fifth Circuit, for instance, has required courts to consider twelve somewhat
overlapping factors in making fee awards. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). One of these is "[w]hether the fee is fixed or
contingent." Id. at 718. The court's original elucidation of this factor in 1974 made
clear that it referred to the fee contract between the plaintiff and his lawyer. See id.
But only three years later, the same language apparently was interpreted to allow con-
sideration of the likelihood of success as well. See Wolf v. Frank, 555 F.2d 1213, 1216-18
(5th Cir. 1977) (modifying district court's fee award, but approving in principle use of
factor based on "contingent nature of success" in calculating award). More recently, the
Circuit has come close to adopting explicitly the Lindy-Grinnell approach. See Copper
Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575, 583 n.15 (5th Cir. 1980); A. MILLER, supra
note 32, at 121-34.
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The contingency bonus has an economic rationale: it compen-
sates the plaintiff's lawyer for his services as an entrepreneur who
bears the risks of litigation. Samuel Berger's explanation of the
Lindy-Grinnell approach clarifies the basis of the theory. 9 He ar-
gues that fees awarded either under a common-fund theory or un-
der a statute awarding fees against unsuccessful defendants should
be based on the market value of the lawyer's services. Thus, fees
should be the product of the hourly rate that the lawyer charges
paying clients, multiplied by the number of hours reasonably de-
voted to the case.4 0 This eliminates-in Berger's theory, if not in
judicial practice-some of the grounds on which hourly rates have
been increased. 4 1 But the logic of his theory preserves the contingency
factor. A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and
provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his
work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is
paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee
award cases.
4 2
Although economic reasoning justifies a contingency bonus, it does
not by itself explain the Lindy-Grinnell approach to calculating the
size of the bonus. A court concerned only with paying the market
value of a lawyer's service might plausibly award a contingent fee
tied to a set percentage of the total award, since that is how the
market compensates lawyers who take the risk of not being paid if
their clients lose.43 But a percentage contingent fee approach would
39. See Berger, supra note 3.
40. When the lawyer has no hourly rate because he works for a legal services or-
ganization or usually charges contingent fees, a surrogate rate should be estimated. See
id. at 824.
41. Lindy and Grinnell allow courts to boost the fee because of the lawyer's skill,
see City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 470 (2d Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Builders,
Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168-69 (3d Cir. 1973),
which should already be reflected in his hourly rate. In addition, some courts consider
the supposed value of the results obtained. See National Ass'n of Regional Medical
Programs, Inc. v. Weinberger, 396 F. Supp. 842, 851 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, 546 F.2d 1043
(D.C. Cir. 1976); A. MILLER, supra note 32, at 60-64, 78-100.
It should be noted that the lawyer paid on an hourly basis can often get his fee
almost immediately, while the contingent-fee lawyer must wait until the end of the
case. In recent years, inflation has aggravated the burden of delay: a recent survey
estimates that the dollar generally loses more than a fifth of its value between the per-
formance of the services and the fee award. Attorney Fee Awards in Antitrust and Se-
curities Class Actions, supra note 36, at 83. Lindy treated this delay as part of the con-
tingency problem, Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 1976), but the logical way of dealing with it would
be to award interest on the basic payment, cf. Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 1272-79
(5th Cir. 1980) (interest awarded on attorney fees from date of original judgment).
42. Berger, supra note 3, at 324-25.
43. See Furtado v. Bishop, 84 F.R.D. 671, 675-77 (D. Mass. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 915
480
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produce too large a fee in a class action for monetary relief and
too small a fee in a "public interest" suit for nonmonetary relief.
Despite the talk of fair market value, then, the goal is not to repli-
cate the market but to reform it, creating adequate but not exces-
sive incentives. Only part of the private market is to be imitated,
the part occupied by lawyers such as those in large firms who care-
fully adjust their fees in light of the demand for their time and
the risk of nonpayment. The less bureaucratic and more swash-
buckling lawyers of the contingent fee era are no longer the mod-
els for fee awards. Neither are those dedicated lawyers whose will-
ingness to serve does not depend on the size of the fee, although
these lawyers are among the most frequent recipients of attorney
fee awards.
This view of the lawyer as a calculating entrepreneur regulated
by calculating judges underlies and explains the Lindy-Grinnell ap-
proach to fixing the size of the contingency bonus.4 4 The goal is
to make fee award cases as attractive financially to lawyers as their
"usual" cases, in which payment of an hourly fee is certain. Judges
should therefore calculate the probability of success that each suc-
cessful fee award case had when the plaintiff's lawyer accepted it.
If only one half of similar claims can be expected to triumph, it
would be necessary to double a fee based on the lawyer's standard
rate. Otherwise, he would make less from a group of similarly con-
tingent cases than from those in which payment of his standard
rate was assured.
This probabilistic rationale has two encouraging consequences for
those who seek fees. One is that a contingency bonus should always
be awarded except in those rare cases in which the plaintiff's lawyer
can be sure of success when he accepts the case.45 The other is that,
if the plaintiff's chance of success was less than one-half, the fee
should be multiplied by a factor greater than two.
4G In theory, there
should be no upper limit to this process: when the chance of suc-
cess was one in fifty, the fee should be multiplied by fifty, and so
(st Cir. 1980) (statutory fee award should be no more than percentage contingent fee
when suit is for monetary relief only and establishes no principle); F. MAcKINNON, supra
note 8, at 28 (contingent fee usually calculated as percentage of plaintiff's recovery).
44. See Berger, supra note 3, at 324-26; Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation,
Deterrence and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL SruD. 47, 71-72 (1975); Springer, Fee
Awards in Antitrust Litigation, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 97, 103 (1975); Comment, Court Award-
ed Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 710-11 (1974).
45. Cf. Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 487-88 (3d Cir. 1978) (high probability of
success not ground for reducing basic fee).
46. See Berger, supra note 3, at 326.
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forth. But commentators 47 and courts4 s have not gone this far.
Because the current treatment of the contingency factor is only
a few years old, courts should not regard it as immutable. Current
practice grew out of the Lindy-Grinnell approach to fee calculation,
which has not been universally accepted 9 and which is only be-
ginning to receive informed evaluation as its results become appar-
ent.5 ° That approach is not free of paradox. It originated in a re-
action against the g-reed of lawyers in cases with large monetary
recoveries, 51 but in the long run the shift away from fees based on
a percentage of the recovery may benefit lawyers by making sub-
stantial fee awards possible in nonmonetary cases. As fee awards pro-
vide more of the bar's income, courts should reevaluate the stan-
dards for their calculation.
II. The Undesirability of Appraising the Contingency
of Each Case: Problems of Current Practice
Current treatment of the contingency factor leaves much to be
desired. Revising the fee award in the light of the plaintiff's original
chances of success tempts lawyers to behave unethically, requires
courts to make a difficult, long, and costly inquiry into those chances,
and treats defendants unfairly. Moreover, it may impair the very
goal that has led to emphasis on the contingency factor: the creation
of a sound system of incentives for certain kinds of litigation.
A. The Lawyers' Conflict of Interest
Evaluation of the contingency factor pits lawyers against their
clients. To increase his fee, the plaintiff's lawyer must show that his
client had only a slight prospect of success when the case was brought.
47. See id. (multipliers greater than three rest on false precision and may exaggerate
awards in least likely cases); Comment, supra note 44, at 711 (multiplier of 100 in case
with one percent chance of success "patently unreasonable"; such suit might be frivolous
or vexatious).
48. See Baughman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 583 F.2d 1208, 1217 (3d Cir.
1978) (contingency multiplier as high as two "most unusual"). The highest any court
appears to have gone in setting a contingency multiplier is four. See Fried v. Utilities
Leasing Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REr'. (CCH) 4 95,695 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (quadrupling warranted by contingency and high quality of counsel's work); note
36 supra (citing other instances of high multipliers).
49. See, e.g., Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 515 F.2d 241, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam) (applying rule of Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th
Cir. 1974), discussed above, see note 38 supra).
50. See Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities Class Actions and Derivative Suits, 3 J.
CORP. L. 267 (1978); Attorney Fee Awards in Antitrust and Securities Class Actions, supra
note 36.
51. See notes 23 & 37 supra (citing cases).
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He will emphasize the barriers the client faced: ambiguous prece-
dents, conflicting evidence, plausible defenses, and the like. As a
result, the merits of the client's claim will be thrown into question
before the judge and opposing counsel.
Meanwhile, the defendant's lawyer will be exposed to a similar
problem, but one that is ultimately practical rather than ethical.
The fee award can be kept down by showing that the plaintiff was
virtually sure to win because of the merit of his claim. Defense
counsel may therefore be tempted to weaken his client's case. But
this involves no conflict of interest between lawyer and client be-
cause the fee will be paid by the client, not by the lawyer.52 The
only question counsel faces is whether his client's interests will be
helped most by conceding the strength of the plaintiff's case in or-
der to keep down the fee award, or by allowing the award to be
boosted by the contingency bonus that may result from insisting
that the plaintiff's victory was freakish. The defendant's lawyer and
his client therefore have not been drawn into conflict; they have, how-
ever, been placed in a highly embarrassing position in which a pos-
sibly unmerited fee award can be avoided only by stressing the
weakness of the defendant's own case.
The conflict of interest and embarrassment resulting from assess-
ment of the contingency factor are most harmful when the case still
has a future at the time the fee is awarded. The award may come
before the end of an action when the plaintiff has triumphed at a
preliminary stage.53 In other cases, the fee award and the merits of
the case may go up on appeal together. 54 In either event, the points
52. Fees can, of course, be awarded directly against an obstructive lawyer. See Road-
way Express, Inc. v. Piper, 100 S. Ct. 2455 (1980) (abuse of discovery); 28 U.S.C. § 1927
(1976), as amended by Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-349, § 3, 94 Stat. 1154 (lawyer who multiplies federal court proceedings unreasonably
and vexatiously is liable for costs, expenses, and attorney fees of such conduct). Such
awards are rare, however.
53. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970); cf. Note,
Interim Awards of Attorneys' Fees Under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act
of 1976, 21 AMz. L. REv. 893, 905-16 (1979) (arguing that Act implicitly authorizes interim
fue awards). But see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980) (per curiam) (plaintiffs'
interlocutory %ictories insufficient to warrant fee award under "prevailing party" standard
of 42 U.S.C. § 1988). The practice of awarding interim fees arises because the kinds of
caes in which fees are awarded often take many years to be completed. See, e.g., Bradley
%. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 722-23 (1974) (delay in awarding fees until end of lengthy
school desegregation litigation would work substantial hardship on plaintiffs and their
attorneys).
54. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); cf. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 100
S. Ct. 745, 752 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (fee award sufficiently final to qualify
for appellate review when district court has entered judgment on fees, regardless of
status of case on merits).
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advanced by the plaintiff's counsel to justify a high fee may later
reappear in support of the defendant's position on the merits.
Yet even when litigation on the merits is completed by the time
the fee is awarded, a lawyer who argues that the contingency factor
should increase his fee still runs the risk of violating his duty to
his client in at least three ways. First, the end of litigation does
not necessarily mean the end of relations between the parties. This
is particularly true in litigation resulting in injunctive relief, such
as the hiring or reinstatement of a worker victimized by discrim-
ination,55 when exposure of the flaws in the worker's lawsuit may
harm his career.56 Second, even if no direct harm results, the lawyer's
presentation could disclose confidential material relating to the case.
Such conduct would violate the client's expectation of confidentiality
from his lawyer. Even though the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility contains a convenient clause allowing lawyers to disclose con-
fidences in order to collect their fees, that clause seems inappro-
priate when the client is not objecting to the fee.5 7 Third, for a
lawyer to demolish in court the case he has just built on behalf of
his client is not a seemly process, and is likely to encourage all con-
cerned to think of law and lawyers as wholly malleable and un-
principled.58
Do these bad practices actually occur? The conscientious lawyer,
of course, will refrain from criticizing his client's case at a fee hear-
ing. He will seek a contingency bonus without challenging the merits
of his client's case, by emphasizing instead the vigor of the opposing
party.5 9 Yet more questionable arguments undermining a plaintiff's
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) (relief for violation of equal employment oppor-
tunity law may include reinstatement of complaining employee).
56. Cf. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-101
(A)(3) (1980) (forbidding intentional damage or prejudice to client by attorney).
57. See id., DISCIPLINARY RULE 4-l0l(C)(4). One might question whether this provision
should apply to a lawyer's use of the client's confidences to collect a fee from a third
party who could use the confidences against the client. See Levine, Self-Interest or Self-
Defense: Lawyer Disregard of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Profit and Protection, 5
HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 801-18 (1977) (discussing and criticizing breadth of disclosure that
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(4) permits lawyer); ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(C)(3) (Discussion Draft
Jan. 30, 1980) (attorney may make disclosures to secure fee only in establishing claim or
defense in controversy between lawyer and client).
58. Cf. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 71 (1932) (attorney should
not challenge validity of document he drafted). This ethical problem besets defendants'
lawyers opposing high fees as well as plaintiffs' lawyers seeking them.
59. Cf. Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 431 F.2d 334, 341 (5th Cir.
1970) (presence of "formidable, resourceful opposition" to be considered in making fee
award); 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 6926k (courts properly consider experience, talent,
and financial backing of defense counsel in assessing contingent risk of success).
Vol. 90: 473, 1981
Contingency Bonuses
own case have sometimes appeared.0 0 Such arguments can be ex-
pected to multiply as attorney fee statutes accomplish their goal of
encouraging lawyers motivated more by money than by altruism
to accept cases. In any event, lawyers should not be placed in a
position in which their interests conflict directly with those of their
clients, even if most lawyers will resist the temptation to put their
own interests first.
It is small comfort that a few alert clients will agree in advance
with their lawyers that certain arguments will not be presented
when fees are sought. That remedy places on the clients the duty
of finding, preventing, and policing disloyalty by their lawyers, often
in cases in which the clients' sophistication and monetary stake are
small. Clients cannot remove the conflict of interest by agreeing to
pay their lawyers regardless of the amount awarded under the at-
torney fee statutes: 0' if clients could give such guarantees, there
would be no need for contingency bonuses.
The growth of conflicts of interest between lawyer and client is
an important argument against the contingency bonus, but not nec-
essarily a decisive one. Most current methods of paying lawyers in-
volve some possibility of conflict with clients.62 Still, one should dis-
tinguish between a practice that involves some inevitable divergence
between the interests of lawyers and clients and one that holds out
a direct incentive to lawyers to raise their fees by attacking the
strength of their clients' claims.
B. Retroactive Calculation of the Probability of Success
Evaluation of the contingency factor under the current system
requires the court to estimate, after a plaintiff has prevailed, how
likely success seemed when the lawyer first considered bringing the
suit. 3 This task is burdensome, complicated, and often of doubtful
60. See 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 24, ch. 13 app., at 1526-32 (reproducing petitioners'
post-trial brief in Lindy, in which lawyers explained obstacles to holding that their clients
had standing); cf. id. §§ 6926d-6926j (discussing contingency fee awards based in part
on weaknesses of plaintiffs' cases).
61. Such an agreement would not affect the losing defendant's liability for fees. See,
e.g., New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 70 n.9 (1980); Note, Awards
of Attorney's Fees to Legal Aid Offices, 87 HARV. L. REv. 411, 418-19 (1973).
62. See Clermont & Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. RFV.
529, 534-46 (1978) (examining economic conflicts of interest between lawyer and client
under hourly and contingent fee systems). The possibility is especially significant in a
clas action because some class members have not agreed to retain the lawyer and because
the interests of all members may not be identical. See Developments in the Law-Class
Actions, 89 H.%Rv. L. Rav. 1318, 1577-78, 1592-97 (1976).
63. See pp. 479, 481-82 supra.
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propriety. It ultimately calls on the court to consider just how likely
it was that justice would prevail in a particular case.
It is difficult enough to adjudicate a controversy between adverse
parties. A large burden is added if courts must also consider each
of the ways in which issues might have been decided, guess how
likely each decision was, and then combine these results into an
overall assessment of the plaintiff's chances. The inquiry will not
be short: a large contingency multiplier brings a large fee to the
lawyer litigating the matter, so he has a strong interest in present-
ing every possible argument.64 The defendant, having just lost on
the merits, will not want to enrich the plaintiff's lawyer, so resis-
tance will probably be vigorous. Judges, finally, are unlikely to treat
the remuneration of lawyers lightly.
Nor is it easy to apply concepts of probability to a unique litigation
rather than to a series of similar events. We can explain the state-
ment "this coin has a 0.5 probability of coming up heads" as mean-
ing that, as the coin is thrown more often, the percentage of tosses
that result in heads will come closer to fifty percent. When we deal
with the probability of winning a single litigation, however, we must
speculate about retrials of the same case before different judges and
jurors, or imagine well-informed gamblers betting on the outcome
of the case. 65 Sometimes courts cannot avoid these difficulties and
must estimate a plaintiff's chances of success, particularly when he
claims immediate interlocutory relief.60 Yet that is no reason to im-
port such complexities when they are not necessary and when they
expand what should be a relatively minor part of the litigation.
That attorney fees are awarded after the merits have been de-
cided 67 adds the confusions of hindsight to the assessment of how
likely success was when the case began. In one respect, it is easier
to appraise the plaintiff's chances of success after the case has been
tried, for the evidence and arguments on both sides are apparent.
Yet once the result is known, it is hard for judges and lawyers to
regain a perspective of ignorance and to treat the result as only one
of several that were initially possible. The difficulty of assessing a
64. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 410 (D. Colo. 1977) (law-
yers devoted 505 hours to fee claim; 125 hours would have been reasonable).
65. See, e.g., L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE § 30 (1977); Cullison, Proba-
bility Analysis of Judicial Fact-Finding: A Preliminary Outline of the Subjective Approach,
I U. TOL. L. REV. 538 (1969).
66. See Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525
(1978).
67. Even when interim fees are awarded, as described above, see p. 483 & note 53 supra,
they are awarded for the successful litigation of issues already decided by the court.
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case's original prospects after it has been decided was demonstrated
amusingly in Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority," in which
the Second Circuit upheld an equal protection claim, but denied
the plaintiff a contingency bonus for establishing it. The legal issues,
it observed, "were relatively simple and few." 69 The Supreme Court,
however, reversed on the merits, requiring three opinions covering
over forty pages of the official reports to explain its views.70 In ad-
dition, the subjectivity of any assessment of a plaintiff's original pros-
pects will tempt judges to use contingency as a mask to conceal other
considerations. Courts will grant purported contingency bonuses to
reward lawyers for the quality of their work and the difficulty of
the case, even though these factors should already be reflected in
the hourly rate assigned to the lawyers and the number of hours
for which they are compensated.
For a court that has already upheld the plaintiff's case to assess
how likely it was to do so raises problems of propriety as well as
practicality. In effect, the court is being asked to decide how likely
it was to reach what is now recognized as the right result. One may
question whether a judge should be called upon to look for the dust
swept under the same rug on which he is standing.
The problem is most striking when it is claimed that the plain-
tiff's chances of success were less than even, so that his lawyer is
entitled to have his fees multiplied by more than two. In such a
case, the obvious question is why the plaintiff won at all-and the
most obvious answer is that he won because the case was wrongly
decided. No one, presumably, would argue that the court should
increase the lawyer's fee because he succeeded in winning a case that
he should have lost. Perhaps this explains why contingency factors
gTeater than two, though not unheard of,71 are rare.72
68. 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
69. Id. at 100.
70. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). For a similar example
of the difficulty of estimating the likelihood of success, compare Hughes v. Rowe, 101 S. Ct.
173, 177-79 (1980) (per curiam) with id. at 180-82 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
71. See notes 35 & 36 supra (citing examples).
72. The difficulty of concluding that a gihen success was initially improbable can
',ometimes be avoided. When crucial evidence supporting the plaintiff's case could not
be known to his lawyer at the time he accepted the case, one can decide that the chances
of success seemed small without in any way impeaching the reliability of judicial pro-
ceedings. Alternatively, the impeachment may be less painful, at least for judges, when
the case has been tried by a jury and it is the jury's questionable reliability that is in
isue. Lastly, when the case has been settled without trial, evaluation of the plaintiff's
original chances of success can obviously proceed without any hindrance from a court's
rcs,,lution of the merits. This last possibility, of course, may only push the court from
the frying pan into the fire: since the case has not been decided, it is hard to measure
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Even when the plaintiff claims that his chances of success were
greater than one-half, the court will still have to decide by how much
they fell short of certainty, and will therefore face a similarly em-
barrassing inquiry into its own fallibility.7 3 If the plaintiff argues
that conflicting precedents made success unsure, the court must con-
sider how likely it was that the precedents could have led it to what
is now recognized as the wrong decision. If the claim is that the de-
fendant's sorcerous lawyers dimmed the plaintiff's prospects, the court
must consider how likely it was that the lawyers would succeed in
their conjuring, and whether the plaintiff's lawyer should have been
aware of his own ability and that of the judge to dispel the illusion.
Such efforts to analyze judicial decisionmaking are likely to be as
unsuccessful as they are unedifying. Some of the most unpredictable
judges, for example, will by the end of the case have the most rigid
confidence in the inevitability of their own judgments.
Except in rare situations, trying to look back and compute the
contingency of success when the case began is thus likely to be both
demoralizing and cumbersome. This is not to say that we must be-
lieve that the meritorious side always prevails at trial or that the
result of litigation is usually clear in advance. But the best evi-
dence of the likely result is usually the result that is actually reached,
the result we expect the parties to live with. The lawyers should
also have to live with it, absent some truly compelling reason for
plunging back into the uncertainties that the trial was designed to
resolve.
C. Unfairness to Defendants
When attorney fees are paid by the defendant, increasing them
because the plaintiff's success was uncertain can produce bizarre and
unfair results. The smaller the plaintiff's prospects of success, the
greater the contingency bonus paid to his persevering lawyer. Yet
this means that the defendant must pay more when the balance of
precedent and evidence was relatively favorable to him. On the other
hand, when the plaintiff was certain of success because the defen-
the plaintiff's chances of success without replicating the very trial that the settlement
was meant to avoid. Just this kind of evaluation is required, however, when a court is
asked to approve a class action settlement. See 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 5610a.
73. For arguments that courts should recognize their fallibility and reach explicitly
compromising decisions in hard cases, see Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compro-
mise-The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U.L. Rav. 750 (1964), and Coons, Compromise
as Precise Justice, in COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS: NOMOS XXI at 190
(J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1979).
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dant's position was hopeless or frivolous, the defendant pays no con-
tingency bonus.7 4 Furthermore, the contingency bonus is extracted
from that defendant in order to reward the plaintiff's bar for bring-
ing similar but unsuccessful suits against other defendants. If such
litigation is to be subsidized, one may well ask why the subsidy
should come from the defendant in another case.
These objections apply only when the defendant pays the attor-
ney fees, but that is now the usual case. The increasingly important
attorney fee statutes generally provide for payment of fees by the
losing party.75 Under the common-fund theory, those who benefit
from the litigation should pay the fee,70 but in practice the burden
may still fall on the defendant. If the case is settled, for example,
the settlement may provide for the establishment of a fund to com-
pensate those injured, and for later assessment of reasonable attor-
ney fees against the defendant by the court.77 Even when the fee
comes out of the compensation fund, much of it may be assessed
against the portion of the fund that has not been claimed by those
entitled to do so; in this instance, too, the defendant is ultimately
burdened by the fee.78 Lastly, in cases in which there is no fund
out of which fees may be paid because the benefits are not mone-
tary, the defendant may be required to pay the fee, on the theory
that it is in the best position to pass on the burden to the beneficiaries.1 9
Three arguments palliate, but do not remove, the injustice of im-
74. For similar criticism, see Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020 (3d
Cir. 1977) (referring to contingency factor in statutory fee award cases); Note, Promoting
the 'indieation of Civil Rights Through the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80 COLUM. L.
REv. 346, 375 (1980) (civil rights cases).
75. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1976) (suits under Clean Air Amendments of
1970); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (suits under various sections of Civil Rights Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2OOc-5(k) (1976) (suits under Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act). But cf. 22 U.S.C. §
277d-21 (1976) (in claims for compensation for injury resulting from land acquisition by
goernment, fee award comes out of recovery). Although a successful plaintiff can recover
fct, under these statutes except in special circumstances, a successful defendant can
rccover fees only when the plaintiff's claim was frivolous. See, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 101
S. Ct. 173, 178-79 (1980) (per curiam) (42 U.S.C. § 1988); Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978) (Title VII).
76. See pp. 476-77 supra (discussing doctrine). It is fair to require these beneficiaries
to pay more when their case was risky, and hence less able to attract counsel and perhaps
le's meritorious.
77. See 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 5620b. Of course, the plaintiffs may have had
to make concessions to the defendant in exchange for this commitment.
78. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 100 S. Ct. 745, 749-50 (1980). The Court did not
decide whether the defendant in this case could recover the money ultimately remaining
in the fund. Id. at 751 n.8.
79. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1973) (requiring defendant union to pay
plaintiff's attorney fees properly forces union members to pay for plaintiff's vindication
of union democracy).
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posing the heaviest fees on the defendants with the strongest cases.
First, no fee at all is imposed unless the defendant loses the case,
and is therefore an adjudicated violator of the law. 0 It does seem
fair to make those who violate the law, whatever their good faith,
pay the costs of enforcing it, at least when those costs would other-
wise fall on the victims of illegality.8' However, this argument sup-
ports only the imposition of attorney costs on unsuccessful defendants,
not the multiplication of those costs when the plaintiff's case was not
promising at the outset. It is fair for violators to pay the costs of
enforcing a statute, but it is ludicrous for violators with a relatively
good case to have their payments multiplied while those of flagrant
violators are not.
Second, we may try to justify the contingency bonus on deterrence
grounds. This argument suffers from similar defects. No doubt at-
torney fee awards discourage potential defendants from violating the
law and resisting meritorious litigation, but the contingency bonus
bears virtually no relation to this goal. If we wish to deter obstruc-
tive defenses, the largest fee awards should be charged to defendants
with the weakest cases. The contingency bonus system has just the
opposite effect. If we wish, alternatively, to deter the original vio-
lation of the law, the deterrent should be the largest when the viola-
tion is most indisputable, most harmful, and most profitable for the
violator .82 None of these factors influences the contingency bonus.
Third, the contingency bonus is arguably a way of approximating
the costs that plaintiffs have to pay to obtain counsel in the market-
place. A plaintiff whose chances of victory are smaller, and who can-
not afford to pay his lawyer unless he wins, will have to promise
his lawyer more than a plaintiff sure to succeed. Granting a larger
fee award to the first plaintiff and his lawyer simply imposes on the
80. This argument is not strictly true when attorney fees are imposed as part of a
settlement; nevertheless, in such a case the defendant has in effect consented to be treated
as a violator.
81. We might argue that the cost of enforcing a major statutory policy should also
be shared by people who are not violators, for instance those throughout society who
expect to benefit from the statute. This argument leads to the use of taxes to fund en-
forcements, as in fact occurs when the enforcer is a government agency. So far, the gov-
ernment finances private legal activities in only a few instances. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
57a(h) (1976), as amended by Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-252, § 10(a), (b), 94 Stat. 374 (FTC pays costs of certain parties who contribute
to rulemaking proceedings); cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (1976) (establishment of Legal
Services Corporation).
82. The deterrent should also be increased as the defendant's chances of detection
decrease. This general rule is examined closely in Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Trade-
off Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REv. 880 (1979).
Other factors might also be considered, such as the violator's ability to pay.
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defendant the real cost of vindicating the plaintiff's rights.8 3 This
argument, however, oversimplifies the way prices are set in the mar-
ket for legal services. When a fee is not awarded by the court, the
fee for plaintiffs who cannot pay unless they win is a percentage of
the plaintiff's recovery,8 4 not an hourly fee multiplied by a con-
tingency factor. Furthermore, there is no evidence that lawyers scale
the percentage they demand for contingent fees on the basis of the
probability of success, except perhaps in a very rough way.85 As an
historical matter, the current use of the contingency factor arose not
from new information about market fees but because previous ap-
proaches were thought to be too likely to yield excessive fees when
there were large monetary recoveries, and inadequate payments when
there were not.86 The contingency factor's role was to provide a care-
fully calculated incentive, not to identify market values.
D. Misincentives
If the contingency bonus system is pressed to the limits of its logic,
7
every conceivable claim will be prosecuted. When a claim is sure to
succeed, it will be pressed even though the recovery will be small,
since all the costs of litigation are sure to be shifted to the other
party.88 As the chances of success become smaller, the fee will be
multiplied by a growing contingency factor, so that uncertain claims
will also be pressed.
An example may clarify the extent of the incentive that the con-
tingency bonus provides-or would provide if its theory were fully
83. See Springer, supra note 44, at 103-04 (discussing this rationale for contingency
multipliers in antitrust cases).
84. F. MAcKINNON, supra note 8, at 28; Franklin, Chanin, & Mark, Accidents, Money,
and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REv.
1, 22 n.103 (1961); Reder, Contingent Fees in Litigation with Special Reference to Medi-
cal Malpractice, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 211, 214-19 (S. Rottenberg
ed. 1978).
85. For typical surveys of fee practices, see F. MAcKINNON, supra note 8, at 17-29, 2
S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES §§ 20:10-:22 (1973), and Gerhart, The Art of Billing Clients, in
I L iw OFFICE ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT MANUAL § 25, art. B (P. Hoffman ed. 1980).
Cf. Rosenfield, An Empirical Test of Class-Action Settlement, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 115-
17 (1976) (describing fee practices in class actions).
86. See pp. 477-81 supra.
87. See pp. 481-82 supra.
88. Whether all litigation costs are in fact shifted depends on how costs that have
not traditionally been taxed to the losing party are treated when attorney fees are award-
ed. Courts now often allow recovery of the costs of paralegals and experts. See, e.g.,
Northcross %. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 639-40 (6th Cir. 1979) (paralegals and experts);
Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 82 F.R.D. 405, 409-11 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(expert consultant); Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 456 F. Supp. 77, 82-83 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (paralegals). Of course, costs traditionally taxed to the loser continue to be so
treated. See note 100 infra.
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realized. Suppose a lawyer considers one hundred potential clients,
each with a claim having only a five percent probability of success.
Each plaintiff claims damages of $1,000, and each claim would cost
the plaintiff $2,000 in attorney time to try. Under the contingency
bonus system, the lawyer should accept all these claims. He can ex-
pect to win five cases, for each of which he will receive $2,000, mul-
tiplied by a contingency factor of twenty because each claim had a
chance of one in twenty of succeeding. His total winnings will be
$200,000, precisely what he would have been paid had each of the
hundred clients been willing to pay the costs of litigation.
A lawyer would consequently have no apparent incentive to prefer
strong cases to weak ones, so long as the latter had some slight chance
of success. Even if more clients sought him out than he could rep-
resent, he would have no reason to waste time inquiring into the
merits of their cases before deciding which ones to accept. The only
remunerative inquiry would be to find cases that a judge would view
as highly contingent but that the lawyer considered solid winners.
Such a set of incentives would lead to either of two undesirable
situations. In the first, every conceivable case would be brought, re-
gardless of its prospects of success, its litigation costs, or the size of
the benefits it would bring.8 9 Perhaps the only approximation to this
result that now exists is the appeal brought by an indigent criminal
defendant, who does not pay for his lawyer and therefore has nothing
to lose and everything to gain. If the resulting frequency of appeals
is desirable,90 it is because criminal sanctions should not be imposed
without exceptional procedural safeguards, not because it is desir-
able that all conceivable claims be litigated.
In the second, total litigation would be prevented only by the
limited capacity of courts and lawyers. It would then be necessary
to decide which plaintiffs would have their cases heard. Various se-
lection techniques could be used: waiting one's turn at the lawyer's
office and courthouse; extra payments by clients to lawyers or to
other clients; or preliminary hearings to decide which cases should
be tried.91 None of these methods seems likely to bring about the
89. See Dam, supra note 44, at 71 (discussing this scenario); Comment, supra note 44,
at 711 (same).
90. But see P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & ,f. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 93-95
(1976) (defendants should be paid not to appeal).
91. See I THE ROYAL CONIN'N ON LEGAL SERVICES, FINAL REPORT 140-41 (1979) (dis-
cussing standards English civil legal aid committees should use in deciding to accept
cases); Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in
Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337, 343-62 (1978) (examining legal services or-
ganizations' decisions to accept cases in light of ethical duty to make counsel available).
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nondiscriminatory access to effective justice that attorney fee statutes
and doctrine are meant to promote.
These horribles are of course imaginary: they postulate that the
contingency bonus has been carried far beyond what courts and com-
mentors have yet accepted. 92 But how close the present system will
bring us to the extremes described above or to some other undesir-
able condition of litigation depends on the answers to a number of
questions.
First, how large will contingency multipliers become? After all,
lawyers may draw back from the pessimistic portrayal of their clients'
chances needed to support a high multiplier, and judges will rarely
decide that a plaintiff whose claims they have ruled meritorious was
unlikely to succeed. 93 On the other hand, once contingency multi-
pliers have been set at a given level in a number of cases, judges may
find it hard to deny lawyers in other cases compensation at the same
level. Some tendency toward bonus inflation may thus develop.
Second, what alternatives are available to lawyers who do not take
attorney fee award cases? If those cases must compete for lawyer at-
tention with contingent fee cases that promise a large percentage of
a large recovery, even the contingency bonus may not make court-
awarded fee cases very attractive. On the other hand, those cases will
be very attractive to lawyers who would otherwise have unemployed
time or to public interest firms that would otherwise serve without
any fee at all. 94 The greater the number of such lawyers and firms,
the more likely fee award cases are to be brought.05
Third, how averse are plaintiffs and law firms to risk? Many peo-
ple prefer a sure income of $20,000 to a one-tenth chance of winning
92. See notes 47 9 48 supra (citing authorities).
93. See pp. 484, 486-87 supra.
94. Such firms can recover fees. See, e.g., New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447
U.S. 54, 70 n.9 (1980); Note, supra note 61, at 412-21.
95. It is by no means true, of course, that all good lawyers are motivated solely by
the size and probability of the fee. The behavior of lawyers is influenced by attitudes
ranging from public spirit, see J. HANDLER, E. HOLLINGSWORTH, & H. ERLANGER, LAWYERS
AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS 66 (1978), to preference for wealthy clients, Laumann
& Heinz, Specialization and Prestige in the Legal Profession: The Structure of Deference,
1977 AMi. B. FOUNDATION RrsEARcH J. 155, 177-78, to desire for publicity and advance-
ment, see Komesar & Weisbrod, The Public Interest Law Firm: A Behavioral Analysis,
in PUBLIC INTERLsT LtWv 81, 86-87 (B. Weisbrod ed. 1978); S. WEAVER, DECISION TO PROSE-
CUTE 39-41 (1977). Nevertheless, it seems likely that in the long run a sufficiently wide-
spread practice of awarding attorney fees could encourage people to become or remain
lawyers, even though their gains might be less than those of lawyers specializing in
paying clients. Of course, this might not be desirable if it led to a fee-award bar that
it less able, as well as less prosperous, than the regular litigating bar that represents
defendants.
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5200,000. Such people will be reluctant to accept risky cases promis-
ing a high multiplier if successful, unless the multiplier is raised still
higher to compensate for the unpleasantness of the risk.0 s Others pre-
fer a small chance of a large reward to the more humdrum recom-
penses of other legal work. We do not know how many plaintiffs'
lawyers fall into each of these classes, and therefore do not know
how a given contingency bonus will affect the bar.
Fourth, how predictable are contingency multipliers? The attorney
fee award is made only after the plaintiff has prevailed. Any incen-
tive to take the case must operate much earlier, when the client first
seeks representation. Under the current system, the size of the con-
tingency bonus is unpredictable, and its effect is therefore unclear.
Lawyers must reckon, not only with the contingencies of litigation,
but also with those of awards. In addition, some lawyers will be more
confident than others that they will win or that a large bonus will
be granted.
Fifth, how are the incentives for lawyers to accept cases modified
by the incentives to work on or neglect them once accepted? The
current approach focuses on the decision to accept cases, offering a
contingency multiplier based on the prospects of success then appar-
ent. This means that, should the lawyer become more hopeful of
success as the case proceeds, he may be tempted to swell the time de-
voted to the case, hoping to reap both his usual time charges and a
pleasing bonus. To disallow wasted hours when awarding the attorney
fee is only a partial remedy, since any attempt to distinguish appro-
priate from inappropriate hours must be crude.0 7 A few courts have
therefore broken down the litigation into stages, fixing a contingency
multiplier for each stage in light of the prospects of triumph at that
particular stage. 98 This could correct the incentive to overprepare the
case, but may also derange the incentive to accept it.
96. Cf. Schaefer, Uncertainty and the Law of Damages, 19 WM. & MARY L.Q. 719, 719
(1978) (uncertainty lessens value of any opportunity to receive future earnings). A firm
large enough to handle many risky cases can reduce the relative impact of uncertain
litigation results, since the overall success rate will be more stable and predictable than
the results of a single case.
97. See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 641 (6th Cir. 1979) (using five
percent reduction factor rather than attempting to identify duplicative hours); Attorney
Fee Awards in Antitrust and Securities Class Actions, supra note 36, at 130 (4.8% of
hours sought disallowed).
98. E.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir. 1977). Simi-
larly, courts have denied any contingency bonus for the time spent seeking the attorney
fees, since by the time the fee was sought, the plaintiff had already won the case and
there was no remaining contingency. E.g., Baughman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co.,
583 F.2d 1208, 1219 (3d Cir. 1978); cf. Jorstad v. IDS Realty Trust, [1981] FaD. SEc. L. RrP.
(CCH) fj 97,902, at 90,581 (8th Cir. 1981) (reversing bonus award for fee application time
494
Vol. 90: 473, 1981
Contingency Bonuses
Sixth, what do contingency multipliers multiply? The theory is
that the multiplicand is a fee set according to the lawyer's fair mar-
ket value for the number of hours reasonably devoted to the case.
But neither the fair market value nor the number of hours can be
known precisely. The rate a lawyer is able to charge varies from case
to case, sometimes including additions or subtractions on account of
the difficulty and success of the case or the wealth and pliability of
the client.99 The number of hours attributed to a case can be ex-
panded by optimistic record-keeping, and contracted by a skeptical
judge, and the reasonableness of those hours is always open to debate.
When the dust clears, the fee that the contingency factor multiplies
may be larger or smaller than what the lawyer would have earned
had his time been hired by paying clients. Without a good deal of
empirical research, it is impossible to say whether these variances will
show any systematic trends, or how they will affect the willingness
of lawyers to accept fee award cases.
Seventh, how will the impact of fee incentives be modified by the
interplay between lawyers and clients? Incentives may make a lawyer
willing to sue, but his clients may still draw back. They must balance
what they hope to obtain from the suit against the prospect of paying
the defendant's costs other than attorney fees,100 the disadvantages
of an open dispute with the defendant, and the revolting experiences
of litigation. On the other hand, an enthusiastic client may be able
to add to the incentives of court-awarded fees by promising his lawyer
part of the recovery.' 0 ' The general tendency of such arrangements
because reasonable fee provided for and because plaintiff conceded such increase would
be improper). These are all instances in which the contingency of the case declines while
it is pending; an increase, however, is also possible, for instance when the court denies
class action certification. See Cohen, "Not Dead but Only Sleeping": The Rejection of
the Death Knell Doctrine and the Survival of Class Actions Denied Certification, 59 B.U.
L. REv. 257, 291-300 (1979).
99. Cf. S. NAGEL & M. NEEF, DECISION THEORY AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 217-48 (1979)
(applying portfolio theory to lawyers' allocation of time between cases); Clermont &
Currivan, supra note 62, at 534-46 (discussing failure of either contingent fee or hourly
fee to resolve economic conflicts of interest between lawyer and client).
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (taxation of various court fees and
compensation of certain experts and interpreters); FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) (costs ordinarily
allowed to prevailing party).
101. Lawyers and clients have some freedom to reach their own fee arrangements with
each other without affecting the amount of the fee that the court will award. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1970) (lawyer allegedly
received nothing); Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 86
(15t Cir. 1970) (contract for lawyer to receive more than statutory fee). One discrepancy
between these two cases shows the solicitude of courts for lawyers. If the client agrees
to pay the lawyer a fee in addition to the statutory fee, Farmington allows the lawyer
to keep both fees unless this would be plainly inequitable or unethical. 421 F.2d at 87-91.
But even if the lawyer agrees not to be paid by the client, Miller permits the lawyer to
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should be to increase the number of cases brought, since they make
it possible for lawyer and client to adjust the division of the pos-
sible pie so that litigation is desirable for both of them.
Thus, current contingency factor practice cannot be justified on
the ground that it provides an appropriate incentive for litigation.
The reasoning on which the practice is based points toward a plainly
inappropriate incentive, one that would exclude entirely the costs of
litigation from the calculations of those contemplating suit. The prac-
tice no doubt falls short of this end, but it is impossible to say just
how far short it falls and how much of an incentive is actually pro-
vided. 10 2 Only extensive empirical research of a sort that has not yet
been conducted could answer these questions.
Even that research would not tell us how large an incentive is de-
sirable if we reject the current theory's implicit goal of litigating all
but the most hopeless claims. Indeed, that theory's greatest flaw is to
hide the inescapable conclusion that a contingency factor implies a
decision about how far society wishes to go to encourage claims at
recover a statutory fee, with no crumb allowed to reach the client. See also Dennis v.
Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1309 (9th Cir. 1980) (despite statutory language, fee should be paid
to legal service organization, not to client). But the shoe may soon be on the other
foot if the Justice Department's class action bill passes, since it provides for certain in-
centive payments to private relators that may not be passed on directly or indirectly to
their lawyers. H.R. 5103, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., § 2(a) (1979); cf. Hamilton v. Econo-Car
Int'l, No. 79-2179 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 14, 1980), noted in NAT'L L.J., Dec. 1, 1980, at 43, col.
I (fees awarded as discovery sanction must go to client when lawyers retained on con-
tingency basis); International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d
1255, 1278 (8th Cir. 1980) (attorney fees reduced when contingency fee agreement be-
tween lawyer and client results in unreasonable fee); Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645,
648 (1st Cir. 1978) (if contingent fee in addition to statutory fee award would overcom-
pensate lawyer, court can require statutory award to be paid to client).
102. The impossibility of determining on general principles the incentive provided
by fee practices is shown strikingly by the results of a survey that concluded that fewer
than forty-five percent of the federal class actions for damages brought in the District
of Columbia had any success. See Note, The Rule 23(bX3) Class Action: An Empirical
Study, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1135-38 (1974); cf. DuVal, The Class Action as an Antitrust
Enforcement Device: The Chicago Experience (pt. 2), 1976 Am!. B. FOUNDATION RESARCH
J. 1273, 1327 (18 out of 27 antitrust class actions obtained some relief). Attorney fecs are
available in class actions for damages under the common-fund theory, and often also
under such statutes as 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (recovery in antitrust suits). Under the rea-
soning that supports the present contingency bonus system, this low success rate sug-
gests that ample incentives exist to bring class actions that do not enjoy an overwhelming
likelihood of success. But a more plausible view is that lack of success reflects the tre-
mendous expense and complexity of litigating a class action to a successful conclusion,
not lack of intrinsic merit. Cf. DuVal, supra, at 1332-44 (by implication) (discussing fac-
tors reducing degree of success); Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of
Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L. REv. 542, 545, 564-67 (1980)
(study of 205 suits against corporations reporting 75.3% success rate and large attorney
fees). If so, the percentage of success might be increased by increasing the fee awards
available, or by using some entirely different way of financing big cases. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 15c (1976) (monetary relief in parens patriae antitrust suit by state attorney
general); NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16, 1980, at 3, col. I (loans to finance suits).
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the expense of unsuccessful defendants. The theory aspires to the
inevitability of mathematics and has given rise to a practice entangled
in assessing the likelihood that particular cases would succeed. The
most that can be said for today's system is that it is possible to imagine
a variety of other systems that would provide plainly inappropriate
incentives, while the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the pres-
ent system's incentives at least remains unascertained. This faint praise
would be equally applicable to a far simpler system, such as one that
automatically added a fifty percent bonus to all fee awards.'0 3
III. The Contingency Bonus and Other Litigation Incentives
If the existing system of contingency bonuses is in conceptual dis-
array, we face an important question: why is any practice of awarding
increased attorney fees an appropriate means to encourage suits of a
certain type? The existence of statutes and doctrines providing for at-
torney fees (without a contingency bonus) to successful plaintiffs does
not resolve the matter. These legal rules reflect a judgment that some
kind of incentive is desirable, but they tell us little about the nature
and size of the appropriate incentive. In addition, there are many
other ways of encouraging litigation: we can change the substantive
law to make a claim easier to prove, we can increase damage awards,
or we can simply award unaugmented attorney fees, discarding any
notion of contingency bonuses. Nevertheless, when we examine these
alternatives and compare them with the contingency bonus, the latter
sometimes emerges as a more easily justified incentive. The justifi-
cation, however, is complex and requires that the current system of
contingency bonuses be reshaped in a more defensible form.
Changes in substantive law, particularly in elements and burdens
of proof, have an initial appeal as ways to increase the number of ac-
tions brought.104 We might, for example, wish to encourage more
school desegregation suits, and we might choose to do so by simplify-
ing the complex and expensive task of proving that a public school
system has been intentionally segregated. 0 One way to simplify
103. The fifty percent figure has an analogue in English practice, in which a figure
designed to reflect the actual cost of pretrial work is increased automatically by an ar-
bitrary amount, often fifty percent of the original figure. See Regina v. Wilkinson, [1980]
I W.L.R. 396 (Q.B. 1979). This increase, however, is not contingent on the client's success.
104. Cf. Comment, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule lOb-5, 38 U. CHI. L. REv.
'337, 365-71 (1971) (examining tendency of class actions to relax requirements of Rule
lOb-5 suits).
105. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo.), supplemented in
313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir.
1971), modified, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), on renand, 368 F. Supp. 207 (D. Colo. 1973), aff'd
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the proof would be to eliminate entirely the requirement that plain-
tiffs show intentionally segregative governmental action. This reform,
however, would obviously make it possible to desegregate any school
system in which segregation has arisen without intentional govern-
mental help. Whether that should be allowed turns on considera-
tions that transcend the desirability of encouraging the litigation of
claims of intentional segregation. 1 6
A second approach to litigation incentives is to modify remedies.
The most notable example of remedy modification is the provision
for treble damages in antitrust actions.' 0 7 In the desegregation area
discussed above, one might award successful plaintiffs damages or
novel injunctive relief of great value. Such measures encourage plain-
tiffs to sue and discourage defendants from committing violations
and defending close cases instead of settling. This approach, how-
ever, is subject to two objections. First, remedy modification might
contravene the policies implicit in the law of remedies. Defendants
would have to pay more, and plaintiffs would receive more, than
previous judges or legislators thought just or politic. 0 8 Second, reme-
dial changes have inconsistent results, increasing only certain types
of suits. A treble damage provision, for instance, provides a strong
incentive to sue if large damages have been inflicted, a weak in-
centive if the damages have been small, and no incentive if only
injunctive relief can be claimed. This variable set of incentives makes
sense if our goal is to minimize the economic injury caused by vio-
lations. It makes less sense if we wish to maximize compliance with
the law regardless of the economic impact caused by violations, or
to help potential plaintiffs who could not otherwise afford to sue.
A properly shaped contingency bonus, by contrast, implies no chal-
lenge to existing substantive or remedial policy. Rather, it reflects
the view that the costs of enforcing certain legal rules that we want
enforced should be spread among those who made the litigation nec-
essary.10 9 As such, the contingency bonus stands on an independent
in relevant part, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976). More
than 10,000 hours were devoted by the plaintiffs' lawyers to the case, including both
the violation and remedy phases. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 407-16
(D. Colo. 1977).
106. See generally Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Em-
pirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275 (1972).
107. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
108. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (limits
on antitrust damages); Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach
to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CI. L. REV. 467 (1980).
109. Of course, this is not a universal principle; in most areas of litigation we do
not make defeated defendants pay even a basic attorney fee, much less a contingency
bonus. Nor does the principle justify the present approach to the contingency bonus.
See pp. 490-91 supra.
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policy footing. In addition, the contingency bonus is less likely to
encourage only claims for large damages. Legal costs constitute a
weighty deterrent to virtually all litigation, regardless of the remedy
sought or the injury caused by the violation. The award even of un-
multiplied attorney fees to successful plaintiffs should therefore en-
courage most suits that are likely to succeed. 110 The added effect of
a contingency bonus should be particularly strong on those suits in
which smaller or no damages are claimed, because suits in which
a large sum is likely to be recovered will tend to be brought even
in the absence of a fee award provision. As the bonus rises, the en-
couragement will spread to suits that are progressively less likely
to succeed.
A third alternative to the contingency bonus would be the award
of unenhanced attorney fees. If the promise of compensation for suc-
cessful suits is a sufficient incentive for plaintiff's lawyers, why both-
er with a contingency multiplier at all? The short answer to this
alternative is that it is incomplete: although we may want to en-
courage many kinds of claims, we may also want to encourage some
more than others. In particular, we must decide how much encourage-
ment to give suits of varying degrees of promise. Ironically, this an-
swer brings us back to the primary weakness of present contingency
bonus doctrine: the doctrine does not make the requisite policy judg-
ments about what suits to encourage and how much to encourage
them. It seems to rest on the virtually indefensible judgment that
every suit not inescapably marked for failure should be brought, re-
gardless of its cost."' In part, decisions about how much encourage-
ment is desirable can be aided by empirical investig-ation of the
obstacles to litigating a particular claim. If, for example, the main
hindrance to litigation is the difficulty of uncovering violations, we
could give incentives proportional to that difficulty."' Setting an
appropriate level of encouragement, however, involves policy con-
siderations as well as empirical inquiry. And as it stands, the con-
tingency bonus is not much better, as a flexible policy instrument,
than a flat award of attorney fees with no eye to desirability of suit
or likelihood of success.
I10. Whether the fee should be awarded to the lawyer or to the client is another
question. I think it should go to the client, subject to fair contractual arrangements
between lawyer and client. This is not current practice, however. See note 101 supra
(discussing effects of contracts on fee awards).
111. See pp. 491-93 supra (discussing effect of pressing every conceivable claim).
112. See Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for
Biach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443, 1455-64 (1980) (punitive contract damages would
ctiunteibalance likelihood that some breaches will not be detected); cf. Polinsky & Shavell,
supra note 82 (examining levels of fines where probability of conviction is less than one).
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Three more plausible policy judgments, however, suggest bases for
a more moderate contingency bonus doctrine. First, the legislature
might decide that certain classes of cases should be litigated even
when their success is far from certain. Second, bonuses could be set
so that litigation of cases in which attorney fee awards are available
is at least as likely to occur as it is in cases brought by clients
who can afford to pay. Third, fee awards might simply be set so
that cases more likely than not to succeed if litigated will be brought.
Each judgment leads to different practices and results; but each ar-
ticulates an intelligible basis for setting litigation incentives. The
three approaches will be examined in the next section.1
3
Acceptance of these policy judgments does not compel us to con-
clude that a contingency bonus system is better for any given class
of cases than some other incentive, such as attorney fees without a
bonus. Because we cannot say just how much incentive is provided
by the current contingency factor practice, 1 4 it is possible that, in a
particular case, a fee award alone might provide a sufficient incen-
tive. Nor do the language or legislative histories of fee statutes com-
pel the award of a bonus. More generally, the incentive scheme pro-
vided by a contingency bonus is more desirable in some cases than
in others. It is useful in enforcing rights that should be enforced
even when little monetary damage results from their violation. Con-
stitutional rights fall in this category, as do other civil rights whose
violation is an affront to basic values. Environmental law violations
are also better remedied when attorney fee awards are multiplied,
since damages are usually not recoverable even when injury has re-
sulted.11,3 A system of contingency bonuses is helpful for statutes in
these and other areas that contemplate enforcement by private at-
torneys general. By contrast, such a system would not be a useful ad-
junct to classical contract law, whose remedial scheme was not shaped
to deter all breaches or to encourage suit regardless of the ratio be-
tween the sum recoverable and the cost of litigation.116
113. See pp. 505-12 infra.
114. See pp. 493-97 supra (discussing problems of misincentives created by current
contingency bonus practices).
115. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976) (in private suits to enforce Federal Water
Pollution Control Act courts may assess civil penalties against offenders; no provision
for award of damages to plaintiff); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (Supp. III 1979) (authorizing pri-
vate injunctive suits to enforce Clean Air Act; no damages provision).
116. See Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77
COLUM. L. REv. 554, 558-77 (1977). One could defend an award of attorney fees under
the Goetz and Scott analysis on the ground that contract breakers should take into account
resulting litigation costs, but this reasoning would not justify a contingency bonus.
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Despite these limitations, the contingency bonus still seems de-
sirable if attorney fee statutes and doctrines are to accomplish their
purposes. These purposes include providing plaintiffs-even some plain-
tiffs not absolutely assured of success-with lawyers comparable in
quality to those representing defendants. 117 Although lawyers' moti-
vations cannot be reduced to a formula, most lawyers of this quality
do seem to consider the prospects of success and the fee recoverable
before adding to their crowded calendars a case in which payment is
contingent.ls Some Elizabethans believed that carrying a piece of
hyena gut would enable one to "foreknow the success and event of
his petitions and sutes in Law,"' " but lawyers today are less credu-
lous. Some allowance for the contingency factor is therefore appropriate.
IV. Alternatives
A contingency award does not require an inquiry into the likelihood
of success in each case. At least three simpler approaches are available
that would achieve more tenable goals than the present system's half-
hearted attempt to make weak cases as desirable to lawyers as strong
ones. The common feature of the three approaches is their use of
formulas applicable to broad classes of cases, thus avoiding the prob-
lems of measuring each case's likelihood of success.
A. The Need for a Comprehensive Approach
The solution to many of the problems of current practice is to
establish a standard contingency multiplier, unrelated to the contin-
gencies of the particular case.' 20 For the moment, we need not consider
precisely how this multiplier would be determined, what class of
cases it will affect, or whether it should govern all the time that a
lawyer devotes to a case.' 2' What is important is that the same formula
be applied to all cases in a broad class.
This approach would remove the ethical dilemmas explored above.
117. Some of my colleagues at Boston University, indeed, suggest simply awarding
successful plaintiffs a fee equal to what the defendant paid its own lawyers.
118. See Dietz, Baird, & Berul, The Medical Malpractice Legal System, in U.S. DEP'T
OF HEW, SECRLr,RY's COMM'N ON MEDICAL N1 LPRACTICE, MLDICAL MNIALPRACTICE app., at
87, 97-100, 104 (1973); DuVal, supra note 102, at 1293-96.
119. THE ELIZABTIHAN Zoo 142 (M. Byrne ed. 1979).
120. But see A. MILLER, supra note 32, at 373-74 (proposing that contingency adjust-
ments should be based only on risks of particular case in question). What Professor
Miller seems to object to is the claim that a lawyer should get a larger fee in a winning
case because the lawyer has also brought several losing cases; he does not discuss the
across-the-board approach urged here.
121. These questions are discussed below. See pp. 505-12 infta.
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A lawyer seeking a fee would not be tempted to display the original
weaknesses of his client's case, since the infirmities of a particular
claim are irrelevant to the fee calculation. The only relevant facts
would be those bearing on the success rate and other characteristics
of a class of similar cases. Retrospective evaluation of each case's pros-
pects of success would likewise be replaced by an inquiry into the
success of that class of cases. That inquiry would be easier and less
embarrassing than what can occur at present.
Furthermore, since all defeated defendants in the class would pay
attorney fees based on the same contingency multiplier, there would
no longer be discrimination against those defendants whose cases were
strongest. It might still be argued that any contingency bonus is un-
fair to losing defendants because it is not designed to pay the cost
of enforcing the law against them, but rather to encourage plaintiffs'
lawyers to keep on litigating even though they lose cases against other,
innocent defendants. Yet in a broader sense it is fair that those whose
violation of the law makes enforcement necessary pay the costs of a
system that makes meritorious suits possible, even though some of
those costs are incurred in connection with unsuccessful suits. After
all, in order to become liable for a fee, one must not only violate
the law, but also refuse redress until some variety of enforcement pro-
ceeding has been started.' 22 Moreover, under an across-the-board sys-
tem, some perceived unfairness could be eliminated by setting the
level of the contingency bonus so that unsuccessful defendants do
not pay the whole cost of enforcement, but only an amount that
would encourage and pay for suits of some appropriate level of merit.
The incentive to lawyers to accept cases would be less prone to dis-
tortion under a comprehensive system than it is now, though much
uncertainty as to the system's actual effects would remain. 23 For one
thing, once the contingency multiplier had been set, it would be
known to the bar. The incentive would therefore be more effective
and consistent in its effects than under the present system, which
depends on a lawyer's ability to guess how much of a bonus he will
receive. For another, as experience with a given multiplier accumu-
lated, it would be possible to appraise its effect on litigation, and
adjust it accordingly. The incentive could be more reliably calibrated
than under the present system, which purports to shape a fitting in-
122. See New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 71 (1980) (Title I'II; fee
recoverable for legal services in state administrative proceeding); Maher v. Gagne, 100
S. Ct. 2570, 2576-77 (1980) (42 U.S.C. § 1983; fee recoverable when suit leads to settlement
and consent decree).
123. See pp. 491-97 supra (discussing misincentives that current system may create).
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centive for each case individually, but must do so on the basis of retro-
spective guesswork. Finally, a uniform contingency multiplier would
provide a greater incentive for lawyers to accept cases likely to succeed
than to accept weaker cases. The screening of cases, inevitable in any
system short of universal litigation, would then reach more sensible
results.
Although it may seem undiscriminating to assess the same contin-
gency bonus in both promising and unpromising cases, comparably
uniform practices are common when attorney fees are awarded by
courts or billed by lawyers. Public interest law firms, for instance,
recover attorney fee awards calculated on substantially the same prin-
ciples as those paid to private lawyers,12 - even though economic theory
would predict that this would create an incentive to accept every case,
promising or unpromising, in which a fee is possible, instead of work-
ing for nonpaying clients. Yet once the principles have been estab-
lished for lawyers who seek profit, it has seemed unfair to deny their
benefit to public interest lawyers, or to excuse defendants sued by
the latter from paying fees. Uniformity is also furthered when a fee
is assessed under the Lindy-Grinnell approach,'12  rather than under
the long list of relevant factors favored by some courts.' 20 In addi-
tion, statutes providing for fee awards usually call simply for "rea-
sonable" awards, 27 requiring courts to work out uniform standards
for what is reasonable in light of the relevant policies, including the
policy against wasteful fee litigation . 2 8
124. E.g., Watkins v. Mobile Hous. Bd., 632 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam);
Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1247-48 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913
(1978); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976). But see EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n
Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579, 593 (2d Cir. 1976) (no abuse of discretion to grant
low award when amount was determined in part because plaintiff's counsel was public
interest law firm).
125. See pp. 478-82 supra (under Lindy-Grinnell, basic fee multiplied by precise con-
tingency multiplier yields award).
126. Such factors include the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of
the questions, the legal skill required, preclusion of other employment, the customary
fee, the fixed or contingent nature of the fee, the time constraints imposed by the case,
the amount involved and the results obtained, the experience, reputation, and ability of
the lawyers, the undesirability of the case, the nature and length of the lawyer's profes-
sional relationship with the client, and the awards in similar cases. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
127. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (antitrust damage suit); IDAHO CODE §§ 12-120 to
-121 (1979) (civil actions). Some laws, however, specify criteria for making fee awards.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2059(e)(4) (1976) (reasonable fee based on actual time used and ex-
penses reasonably incurred, computed at prevailing rate for similar services); ALs,,
Civ. R. 82(a)(I) (fee based on percentage of recovery, decreasing as recovery grows, and
increased if case reaches trial); UNIFORT CLAss AcTiONs AcT § 16(e) (multi-factor approach).
128. An across-the-board approach could be qualified to meet special problems, notably
the incentive for the plaintiff's lawyer to pour extra hours into a case once victory seems
The Yale Law Journal
The shift from an individualized approach to fee awards to an
across-the-board approach should not require legislative action. When
equitable doctrines support fee awards, the courts should be free to
develop fee standards fulfilling the goals of those doctrines. Indeed,
the standards now used have already been shaped and reshaped by
the courts. 120 The common statutory mandate to award "reasonable"
fees leaves room for courts to award contingency bonuses under their
own standards. The legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976130 cites with approval a case in which a con-
tingency bonus was awarded, but does not tie courts down to a par-
ticular computational method.131
To agree that an across-the-board multiplier would be superior to
the current handling of the contingency factor, however, does not tell
us what multiplier should be used. Indeed, trying to find a multiplier
reveals just how difficult a problem of social engineering current
doctrine conceals, and illuminates the basic problems of access to jus-
tice involved in attorney fee standards. Nevertheless, at least three
possible solutions can be identified: multipliers could be fixed by
statute for certain classes of cases; multipliers could be set so that
cases in which fee awards are made are as likely to be brought as
similar, non-award cases; or a uniform multiplier of two could be
set, encouraging at least those claims with a better-than-even chance
of success.
likely. A judge now may deal with this problem by using different multipliers for law-
yer hours at different stages of the case. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560
F.2d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir. 1977). Under an across-the-board approach, rates could be speci-
fied for relevant stages of litigation, as has been proposed for class actions. See pp.
505-06 infra. These rates should be set so that, in an average case, they would result in
an overall contingency bonus of the right size, as defined by the principles to be discussed
below. See pp. 505-12 infra.
129. See pp. 476-77, 478-82 supra (discussing development of common-fund doctrine
and Lindy-Grinnell approach).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
131. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [197 6 ] U.S. CODE CONG. g
AD. NEws 5908, 5913 (citing supplemental district court opinion in Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974)). Of the other two cases cited in the report as
properly applying the appropriate standard, one said nothing about the contingency fac-
tor, Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5047 (C.D. Cal. 1974), and the
other held only that plaintiffs should not be denied a fee award because they had not
contracted to pay their lawyers a fixed fee, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
66 F.R.D. 483, 486 (W.D.N.C. 1975). See also S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42,
reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 774, 808 (Voting Rights Act of 1965
Extension; citing same three cases). The situation is further complicated by the fact
that the first but not the second report cited says that the "appropriate standards, see
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)," are correctly applied
in the three cases cited, although the Johnson approach is not identical with that used
in Davis.
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B. A Legislative Solution
A principal function of the contingency multiplier is to regulate
the volume of litigation. Do we wish plaintiffs with feeble claims to
be able to litigate them without financial risk? If so, a sufficiently
high multiplier will make it worthwhile for some lawyers to abandon
paying clients in order to specialize in such claims. Do we wish claims
to be brought only if they are almost sure to succeed? If so, a low
multiplier will discourage lawyers capable of evaluating cases from
accepting risky ones unless the clients are willing to pay.'
32
Such questions are virtually impossible for a court to answer. The
passage of attorney fee statutes reflects a congressional desire to pro-
vide incentives for certain kinds of litigation, 133 but Congress has not
said just how strong an incentive it wishes. There are dozens of at-
torney fee statutes; they are found in legislation ranging from hobby
protection to mass poisoning. 3 4 No court has the ability or authority
to evaluate even roughly the relative importance of these statutes,
much less to give them the comparative numerical values that are
necessary for contingency multipliers.' 3 : The problem is no simpler
when fees are awarded under the courts' own doctrine of a common
fund or benefit. There, too, acceptance of the appropriateness of an
incentive does not tell us how large it should be.
A legislature is not so limited. Although no legislation concerning
across-the-board multipliers has been enacted, the 1978 version of the
Justice Department's class action reform bill suggests what could be
done.130 The bill would have left previous attorney fee legislation in
132. Plea bargaining practices provide a similar regulation for criminal litigation: the
greater the sentence reduction given to those who plead guilty, the less likely a defendant
with a questionable case will be to go to trial. See McCoy & Mirra, Plea Bargaining as
Due Process in Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REv. 887, 887-88 (1980).
133. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per
curiam) (incentive to sue under Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Berger, supra note
3, at 306-10 (discussing legislative histories).
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 2102 (1976) (proper labeling of hobby items); 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(2)
(1976) (toxic substances control). Other statutes are discussed above. See note 75 supra.
135. Cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975) (28
U.S.C. § 1923 does not permit federal courts to award attorney fees depending on courts'
assessment of importance of public policies involved). Some courts, however, have in-
creased fees in cases thought to confer particularly great public benefit. E.g., National
Ass'n of Regional Medical Programs, Inc. v. Weinberger, 396 F. Snpp. 842, 851 (D.D.C.
1975), a! 'd, 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (suit successfully challenging impoundment
of S125 million in federal funds for health programs).
136. S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). See generally Wells, Reforming Federal Class
Action Procedure: An Analysis of the Justice Department Proposal, 16 HARV. J. LEGIS.
543 (1979) (examining bill). The 1979 version of this bill eliminates the features dis-
cussed here. H.R. 5103, 96th Cong., Ist Scss. (1979). See generally Berry, Ending Sub-
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effect, and also provided for the award of fees to a private relator
who brought or instigated a successful "public action."' 3 T More im-
portantly, the bill set forth detailed standards for the calculation of
fees whenever they were recoverable. 138 The fee was to be based on
the hours reasonably devoted by lawyers and paralegals to the case,
multiplied by their usual billing rate or (for those not billing by
the hour) an hourly fair market value for similar services. This
product was to be multiplied by a risk factor, whose permissible limits
were specified. When the lawyer had relied on evidence or a judg-
ment resulting from a previous governmental proceeding, the maxi-
mum multiplier was 1.75.139 Otherwise, the judge could set a mul-
tiplier between two and three for time spent before the end of the
preliminary hearing that recognized the suit as a class action, and
between 1.75 and 2.5 for subsequent time.
Although the stated purpose of this provision was to confine judi-
cial discretion, 40 implicit in the means the drafters chose was a judg-
ment about the incentive appropriate to class actions. To promise a
lawyer who institutes a class action that, if he succeeds, he will receive
twice his hourly rate or even more, is to make it attractive to sue
even if there is significant doubt of success. The incentive not only
would have encouraged suits, but also would have encouraged the
expansion into class actions of what otherwise might have been indi-
vidual suits, since the multipliers available in class actions under the
statute were larger than those typically set now in either class or
individual suits.
stance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the
Class Damage Action, 80 COLU.Y. L. REV. 299, 322-43 (1980) (analyzing 1979 bill).
An important recent statute provides another method of shaping incentives: in actions
by or against the government, fees are authorized if the prevailing party meets certain
wealth standards, but are limited to no more than $75 per hour except in special circum-
stances. See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204(a), 94 Stat. 2325 (1980)
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1976)). The legislative history indicates that this provision
was not meant to affect standards for fee awards under other statutes. See H. REI'. No.
1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 8631, 8640.
137. S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1978). A public action could be brought under
the 1978 bill by a state or the federal attorney general, or sometimes by a private re-
lator, when a violation of a federal commercial statute inflicted injuries no greater than
S300 per person on 200 or more people, and the total injury exceeded S60,000. See Wells,
supra note 136, at 547-51.
138. S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1978); see Wells, supra note 136, at 547.
139. Commentators and courts have often noted that ability to rely on the results
of a government proceeding reduces the contingency of a case. E.g., 3 H. NEWBERG, supra
note 24, § 6926h, at 1174-80.
140. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice,
Proposed Revisions in Federal Class Damage Procedures: S. 3475 Bill Commentary (1978),
reprinted in Reform of Class Action Litigation Procedures: Hearings Before the Sub-




For Congress to use such a means to encourage a suitable kind
of class action seems eminently appropriate. Until Congress does so,
however, some other approach less tied to statutory policies must be
used by courts to set uniform contingency multipliers.
C. An Equalizing Solution
Courts might set the contingency multiplier so that claims in which
success is uncertain will be as likely to be litigated as are similar
claims of people who can afford to pay for ordinary litigation. Even
wealthy corporations do not litigate every claim. They balance the
benefits that they anticipate from victory against the costs of liti-
gating in light of the probability of success. Under an equalizing ap-
proach, the contingency multiplier would attempt to induce fee-
award lawyers and clients to undertake a similar balancing. The
similarity would be imperfect because the fee would be paid to the
lawyer, while other benefits and harms of the litigation would flow
to the client. But to the extent that lawyers and clients are free to
bargain with each other about whether the lawyer will receive the
court-awarded fee or a smaller or larger one, 141 we might hope that
all the relevant costs and benefits would be taken into account in
the decision whether to litigate.
Implementation of the equalizing approach would require a de-
termination of the success rates in an appropriate class of paying
cases. A contingency multiplier could then be calculated to produce
an equivalent success rate in fee award cases. For instance, if two-thirds
of the paying cases succeed, a contingency multiplier of 1.5 should
make it profitable for lawyers who might obtain paying cases to ac-
cept fee award cases when they believe that two-thirds or more of
those cases will be successful. Of course, since this effect is highly
conjectural, 142 the actual effects of the multiplier should be traced
and the multiplier adjusted so as to produce a closer approximation
of the desired success rate.
This approach would force lawyers and clients to balance the costs
and benefits of litigation, discouraging suits so unlikely to win that
clients able to pay would not think the case worthwhile. 143 Any suc-
141. See pp. 495-96 supra. Of course, even if lawyer and client are free to bargain,
it does not follow that they will actually do so, particularly when it comes to concessions
by the lawyer.
142. See pp. 493-97 supra (discussing unclear effects of contingency multipliers).
143. Cf. I THE ROYAL COMM'N ON LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 91, c 13.24-.26 (whethcr
civil suit receies legal aid depends in part on whether paying client would be advised
to bring it).
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cessful plaintiff would receive a fee award that would provide at
least a reasonable hourly payment, calculated at market rates, for every
hour devoted to the case. This equalizing approach does, of course,
imply a judgment that any additional fee award should not be made
so large as to induce lawyers to accept every case, or even every case
arising under a favored statute. If we really think that justice requires
free lawyers for all claims, the appropriate reaction is to establish a
system of legal insurance or a subsidized bar.144 It is not to award
huge fees in some cases in order to tempt lawyers to abandon others.
An equalizing approach is closely related to the problem that makes a
contingency bonus necessary at all; the problem is not the contingency
of litigation, but the differing ways that paying and nonpaying clients
deal with that contingency. Both kinds of clients want to bring suits
in which success is uncertain, but when a paying client does so, his
lawyer does not bear the resulting risk. If nonpaying clients could
offer similar terms-for instance, by getting a commitment from an
agency that a given suit would be paid for out of public funds-there
would be no need to swell the payment with a contingency bonus.
This is what happens in legal aid cases brought in England: cases
are approved in advance for payment. 145 On the other hand, if we
had a convention that lawyers for paying clients were paid only when
they succeeded, there would again be no need for a contingency
bonus: lawyers for nonpaying clients could simply be awarded fees
calculated in the same way as those paid by paying clients. The con-
tingency bonus is required because clients who cannot (or will not)
pay unless the court awards them fees must compete for lawyers with
clients who can and will pay regardless of whether they win or lose.
An equalizing approach aims to close the gap thus created.
This goal is consistent with some grounds on which Congress has
authorized fee awards. Such awards are sometimes given because plain-
tiffs are expected to be too poor to pay lawyers in advance, and be-
cause even a successful suit will not yield a money judgment from
which a contingent fee can be paid.146 In other instances, a fee award
144. See M. FRANKEL, JUSTICE: COMMODITY OR PUBLIC SERVICE 7-8 (1978) (proposing
subsidized national legal service). In criminal cases, for instance, the federal government
either hires salaried defense counsel or arranges to appoint counsel who are assured of
payment whether they win or lose and therefore require no contingency bonus. Perhaps
the costs of a similar scheme for civil cases could be paid in whole or in part by taxing
unsuccessful litigants.
145. 1 THE ROYAL COMM'N ON LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 91, i 13.1-.72; M. ZANDER,
LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE COMMUNITY 32-36 (1978).
146. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976) (injunctive antitrust suit); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (con-
stitutional and other claims against state officials); see H. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong.,
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is appropriate because cases are thought to spread benefits among
many people, who cannot reasonably be required to help pay the
lawyer bills. 147 In such situations, it is sensible to regard the attorney
fee award as a way to bring litigation obstructed by these problems
into line with practices followed in paying cases.'
48
What class of paying cases should be the source of the statistics from
which an equalizing contingency multiplier is calculated? Sometimes,
it may be possible to find a class closely analogous to a class of fee
award cases. In certain federal housing discrimination suits, for in-
stance, attorney fee awards are available only to plaintiffs who cannot
afford their own lawyers. 149 It might therefore be possible to obtain
statistics on housing discrimination cases brought by paying clients,
who could not recover fees, and to use the success rates of such cases
as a goal for fee award cases. In most contexts, however, this method
would be impossible, since the success rates in many classes of cases-
antitrust damage suits, for instance-already reflect the incentives or
disincentives contributed by current fee award practices.
Ordinarily, then, we would have to turn to information on categories
of litigation unaffected by fee awards. There is some information of
this kind, and it indicates success rates ranging from forty-five per-
cent to eighty percentDO This would yield an initial contingency mul-
2d Sess. 20, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2589 (discussing 15
U.S.C. § 26); S. ReP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. 8. AD. NEws 5808, 5909-10 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1988). Other fee statutes accom-
plish a similar purpose by limiting fee awards to plaintiffs unable to litigate without
them. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970); Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, §
204(a), 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1976)).
147. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976) (disclosure of government documents); see
CONF. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Nevs 6285, 6288. Cost spreading is of course a prime justification for the common-fund
and benefit theories. See pp. 476-77 supra.
148. See Berger, supra note 3, at 314 ("[P]ublic interest cases must be placed on a
comparable financial footing with the competing demands for legal services, which com-
pensate attorneys at the full market value .... ")
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970). Housing discrimination can also be challenged in
the federal courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, see Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968),
in which case the attorney fee provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 apply. There might there-
fore be some tendency for plaintiffs who can pay to follow this second route.
150. See C. CLARK & H. SHULMAN, A STUDY OF LAW ADMINISTRATION IN CONNECTICUT
22, 30-31 (1937) (45% success rate in miscellaneous civil litigation); A. CONARD, J. MORGAN,
R. PRATT, JR., C. VOLTZ, & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS
154-56 (1964) (favorable results by settlement or judgment for plaintiffs in 80% of auto
accident cases in which suit is filed); U.S. DEI"T or HEW, SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MEDICAL MALPRAGTICE 10 (1973) (60% success rate for malpractice
claims); ef. M. ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIvE JUSTICE 60 (1964)
(plaintiffs recover something in 92% of personal injury cases still contested 100 days
after service of process). Except in the last instance, I have computed these percentages
from data in the works cited, rounding them off to the nearest five percent. More de-
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tiplier of 1.25 to 2.2, which is comparable to many current awards.
However, selecting the success rate that the contingency multiplier is
meant to yield could not be entirely objective. Different kinds of pay-
ing litigation have different success rates influenced by the wealth
and power of plaintiffs and defendants, the value of the stakes to each,
and the reactions of lawyers, judges, and jurors. To select any rate
as the goal necessarily implies a judgment about how much litigation
should be encouraged. As in other situations, reference to the market
provides no escape from value judgments.
Once contingency multipliers are set, one could adjust them by
collecting separate statistics on the success rates in such categories of
cases as suits under different statutes, suits for monetary and for non-
monetary relief, and suits brought by rural plaintiffs as against those
brought by plaintiffs who must find counsel in a more expensive
market. Although the courts alone could implement this system, cen-
tralizing the process would have obvious advantages. 151 Methods of
centralization range from the mere compilation of relevant data by
the Federal Judicial Center, with its use left to the courts, to the
promulgation of a federal rule of civil procedure specifying the con-
tingency factors to be used by federal courts and perhaps also stan-
dard hourly time rates to be used in calculating court-awarded fees
for different kinds of lawyers. Centralization would make it possible
to obtain better information at less cost and to promote more uniform
results than would be possible if the contingency factor had to be
worked out in ordinary judicial proceedings. More important, it would
avoid the huge litigation costs that could result were the contingency
factor open to redetermination in every Circuit, in every kind of case,
each time new information became available. It such redetermination
became common, little time and money would have been saved by
rejecting the present cumbersome system.
tailed consideration would certainly reveal imprecisions and failures of comparability
between the various studies involved.
The relevant statistics should count as victories those cases in which plaintiffs prevail
by settlement, since attorney fees may be recovered in such cases. See Maher v. Gagne, 100
S. Ct. 2570, 2576-77 (1980) (fees recoverable in settlement of suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
The same comment applies to cases in which plaintiffs recover less than they claimed.
But when several claims are asserted and only some succeed, some courts in effect treat
the claims as separate suits, and allow fee awards only for the successful ones. E.g.,
Baughman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 583 F.2d 1208, 1214 (3d Cir. 1978). To the
extent that this practice is significant, a comparable approach would have to be fol-
lowed in compiling statistics on success rates.
151. Cf. I THE ROYAL COMM'N ON LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 91, 4"1 37.89-.98 (pro-
posing single body to fix lc.eels of legal fees and charges).
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D. A Simple Solution
There remains one remarkably straightforward approach to setting
a contingency multiplier. Until Congress provides more guidance,
courts could simply double attorney fee awards.
The main argument for this solution is that any claim more likely
than not to prevail should be heard. If lawyers in successful cases
receive a fee twice what they would have received from clients whose
payment is not contingent on success, they will find it profitable to
accept any group of cases of which they expected half or more to
succeed. The system would be predictable, so its incentive for plain-
tiffs and their lawyers-and its disincentive for defendants-would be
unhindered by ignorance. It would be uniform, thus minimizing any
remaining tendency to favor suits for money damages over civil rights
suitS.'5 2 And it would be cheap to administer.
This reasoning is subject to flaws already noted. First, the actual in-
centive effect of a multiplier of two would probably vary in unpredict-
able ways from what simplistic economics implies.15 Second and more
critically, should cases be brought when they are more likely to suc-
ceed than to fail, and not otherwise? It makes good sense to decide
civil cases, once the evidence is heard, according to whether the plain-
tiff's version of the facts is slightly more probable than that of the
defendant. This traditional test reflects the belief that there is no
reason, other than what the evidence may furnish, to prefer victory
for the plaintiff over victory for the defendant. But that does not
mean that the same test should govern whether cases should be brought
in the first place. Courts exist precisely to sift through claims whose
true strength cannot be known without a trial.
Despite these difficulties, a doubled fee would serve as a reasonable
compromise solution. Whatever the level of litigation sought, it does
seem to make intuitive sense that at the least those suits more likely
to succeed than to fail should be brought. This appeal is particularly
strong when we are dealing with classes of cases that Congress or the
courts have found worthy of encouragement through fee awards to
successful plaintiffs. Congress might desire a still higher level of in-
152. See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1 9 76 ] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5908, 5913 (fees should not be reduced in nonpecuniary cases); Berger, supra
note 3, at 310-18 (same).
153. See pp. 493-97 supra (suggesting factors making incentihe effect difficult to
identify).
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centive, but it has not spoken. We should not readily assume a desire
to encourage suits unlikely to be found meritorious; doubling would
not do so, but would still provide a very significant incentive. In-
deed, doubling would probably lead to fee awards larger than today's
average awards and to a greater proportion of unsuccessful suits among
those relying on fee awards than among those brought by paying
clients. Yet these increases would not be large, and defendants could
find some consolation in relief from the unpredictability of today's
occasional mammoth awards and from the multiplying of awards for
reasons other than the contingency factor. There would also, of course,
be relief from litigation about the appropriate multiplier, litigation
in which defendants must often pay for the plaintiff's lawyers as well
as their own.
154
The precision that we seem to abandon by adopting a doubling
multiplier is a false precision. Legal reasoning cannot specify the
precise effect of any fee award or practice on the amount of litigation
that will be brought in the future. The market for legal services is
huge and diverse. Lawyers differ in their motivation, ability to ac-
cept and handle litigation, need for new clients, customary fee for-
mulas and levels, arrangements for dividing fees with partners, and
arrangements with nonpaying clients. Plaintiffs and defendants like-
wise vary in wealth, motivation, organization, complexity, and strength
of claim. Finally, the unpredictable circumstances of litigation are
further clouded by uncertainty about exactly how much Congress or
the courts want to encourage litigation under the dozens of provi-
sions providing for attorney fee awards.
The first approach to contingency multipliers presented in this
article, legislation, 15 requires Congress to consider how much liti-
gation to encourage. Even without congressional help, the second
approach, a market-equalizing solution,1 6 could be implemented if
courts have faith in present litigation statistics and in their ability
to gather information on the effects of a tentative multiplier and to
use it without constant relitigation. Should these conditions not be
met, doubling fee awards would provide a simple and principled ap-
proach that would substantially fulfill the various policies involved
in the assessment of a contingency bonus.
154. On the recovery of legal fees for time spent recovering legal fees, see 3 H. NMV-
BERG, supra note 24, at 688-90 (1980 Supp.) (citing cases).
155. See pp. 505-07 supra.
156. See pp. 507-10 supra.
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Conclusion
As the increase in the availability of attorney fee awards continues,
simple and standardized ways of computing fees will become essential.
This will require a more appropriate treatment of the contingency
factor. Indeed, even if the need for court-awarded fees were dissolved
by the provision of universal legal services, it would still be necessary
to face the question at the heart of the contingency factor problem:
to what extent should society encourage litigation of claims whose
merit is unclear? The selection of a contingency multiplier provides
an intriguing opportunity to wrestle with this question, but the an-
swers given so far have not been satisfactory. This article attempts
to mark the path toward better answers.
